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AGAINST INTERPRETIVE SUPREMACY
Saikrishna Prakash* and John Yoo**
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND

By Larry D. Kramer. New York: Oxford
University Press. 2004. Pp. xii, 363. Cloth, $29.95.

JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Many constitutional scholars are obsessed with judicial review and
the many questions surrounding it.1 One perennial favorite is whether
the Constitution even authorizes judicial review. Another is whether
the other branches of the federal government must obey the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution and what, if anything, the
other branches must do to execute the judiciary's judgments. Marbury
v. Madison2 has been a full-employment program for many
constitutional law scholars, including ourselves.
Larry Kramer, the new Dean of Stanford Law School, shares this
passion. He has devoted roughly the last decade of his career, with two
lengthy law review articles3 and a half a dozen shorter pieces, to these
questions. In these works, he has consistently advanced a two-pronged
argument against judicial review and judicial supremacy. First, Kramer
has claimed that while the Founders explicitly sanctioned judicial
review of state constitutions and laws, they never intended courts to
judge the constitutionality of federal legislation. Given the novelty and
relative obscurity of judicial review in 1789, the Founders would never
have authorized judicial review of federal statutes. Second, Kramer

*
Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1990, Stanford; J.D. 1993,
Yale.-Ed.
** Professor of Law, University of California (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute. A.B. 1989, Harvard; J.D. 1992, Yale. - Ed. Thanks to John McGinnis
and Larry Alexander for helpful conversations.

1. In the interest of clarity, we use "judicial review" rather narrowly, as only
encompassing the power of judges to decide the meaning of a constitution in the course of
hearing a case. Hence, when a litigant claims that some statute violates the federal
Constitution, the judge may decide for herself whether the statute actually does violate the
Constitution. Given our narrow meaning of judicial review, nothing need follow from the
judiciary's reading of the Constitution. In particular, our definition says nothing about what,
if anything, other people must do either with the judiciary's constitutional interpretations or
with the resulting judgments.
2

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

3. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000
Term - Foreword: We the Court, 1 1 5 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer,
We the Court].
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has insisted that rather than crowning the judiciary supreme in
constitutional interpretation, the Constitution actually took for
granted that the people were the final arbiters of the Constitution's
meaning and that they would influence and discipline the federal
branches through voting, petitioning, and mobbing.
Kramer has pulled these arguments together, and in some places
has extended them, in The People Themselves. His criticisms of the
foundations of judicial review remain, but in more muted form.
Whereas Kramer has, in the past, adamantly insisted that the
Constitution's original understanding does not authorize judicial
review, here he makes such comments much less frequently and only
in passing, so much so that some readers may erroneously conclude
that he has abandoned his earlier position. In toning down his claim,
Kramer seems to have learned two lessons: first, that the argument
against judicial review is a losing one (as we have argued, the
Constitution's text contains numerous indications of judicial review's
constitutionality and dozens of founders understood the Constitution
to permit courts to review the constitutionality of federal statutes);
and second, that the argument against judicial supremacy need not
(and should not) rest on a futile assault on judicial review.
The other elements of Kramer's argument - the rejection of
judicial supremacy and the celebration of popular constitutionalism remain pretty much as they were before. Though the arguments may
be couched slightly differently and though Kramer exhumes more of
the historical record, we do not believe that he has fundamentally
altered his claims. For Kramer, the people themselves - not the
courts - should decide the Constitution's meaning through the
process of voting, petitioning, and mobbing.
We should disclose up front that we have criticized the various
incarnations of Kramer's attacks on judicial review.4 As noted, we
believe that the Constitution, properly understood, authorizes federal
courts to judge the constitutionality of federal legislation. Even though
the Constitution does not explicitly grant state courts the same power,
such authority was unnecessary when the Constitution was enacted.5
4. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins ofJudicial Review, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003) (hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Origins]; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John
C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1459 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics of Judicial
Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2003) [hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Questions]; John C.
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards ofFederalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
5. The Court has stated:
We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the
Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that
state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate
claims arising under the laws of the United States.
Tafflin v. Levin, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1989).
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Given background presumptions, because the Constitution never
forbade state court review of the constitutionality of federal
legislation, the state courts could engage in such review.
We share Kramer's view that the Constitution does not crown any
branch supreme in the interpretation of the Constitution although we
reach that conclusion based on the Constitution itself, not on
exogenous theories of politics. We believe that each branch, in the
course of exercising its powers, has an equal responsibility to interpret
the Constitution and to act consistent with their own reading of it.
Judicial review is merely the means by which federal judges
implement the Constitution's higher authority in the course of
deciding cases or controversies.
Nonetheless, we think that Kramer's arguments, even after his
refinements and revisions, suffer from some significant flaws. To begin
with, his book, like his previous works, never adequately defines what
he means either by "judicial supremacy" or by "popular
constitutionalism." One has some general sense, but Kramer never
precisely spells out what he favors and what he opposes. Second, by
focusing exclusively on history, Kramer misses the significant textual
and structural arguments against the notion that the rest of
government must obey the judiciary's constitutional interpretations.
By granting the "judicial power" to the federal courts, the
Constitution gives the judiciary the authority to decide certain cases
and controversies. The courts decide cases by issuing a final judgment.
Once issued, the final judgment decides the case once and for all.
Because the courts have the judicial power'and jurisdiction over cases
arising under the Constitution, when they issue final judgments in
cases that involve constitutional interpretation, other branches must
obey and enforce such judgments.
On the other hand, the judiciary's exercise of judicial power over
cases arising under the Constitution does not suggest that the other
branches (or anyone else for that matter) must embrace the
constitutional interpretations that underlay any particular judgment.
A judicial opinion does not command the same authority as a
judgment and has no more authoritativeness, so far as the Constitution
is concerned, than anyone else's opinion.6 Other branches can choose
to look to judicial opinions in hopes of finding some judicial wisdom

6. Others have made a similar distinction between a judicial judgment and an opinion.
See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the
Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988); Gary Lawson & Christopher Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Edward A.
Hartnett, A Matter of Judgement, not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999).
One noted departmentalist has rejected such a distinction. See Michael Stokes Paulsen. The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
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and to predict how future judges may decide a similar case, but they
need not adopt the reasoning of judges.
Put another way, courts enjoy judgment supremacy - the other
branches must enforce the judgments that resolve Article III cases or
controversies. For the purpose of finally resolving a case, the judiciary
decides who wins and loses, once and for all, even if everyone (save
the prevailing party) thinks the courts have gotten it egregiously
wrong. Courts lack interpretive supremacy - the power to resolve,
once and for all, the Constitution's meaning. The Constitution
nowhere requires that the other branches embrace the judiciary's
constitutional readings. This was the argument Abraham Lincoln
made in response to Dred Scott,7 and we think Lincoln generally had it
right.8 Even though the political branches must enforce the judiciary's
judgments, absolutely no one need obey the judiciary's readings
of the Constitution.
What about the people themselves? Though "We the People"
established the Constitution and may amend it, the people themselves
are not the arbiters of the Constitution's meaning. The Constitution
does not establish a People's Court or a People's Committee by which
the people definitively decide the Constitution's meaning. Moreover,
we have never decided cases by reference to who won at the ballot box
or by which side had the biggest, most violent mob.9
None of this denies the significant role that the people can play in
constitutional interpretation. Individuals can voice their own readings
of the Constitution. They can take actions, such as voting, petitioning,
and assembling, which can:' shape what government actors believe and
say about the Constitution. They can elect state and federal legislators
who can trigger the process for amending the Constitution. They can
elect a President and Senate who can use the appointments process to
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
8. Lincoln explained:

I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided
by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon
the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high
respect and consideration, in all parallel cases by all other departments of the government.
And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any case, still the
evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be
overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the
evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if a policy
of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed
by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between
parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that
extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECfED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
9. Some scholars argue national elections do occasionally function as quasi
constitutional amendments. For the theory of "constitutional moments," see BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993).
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change the composition of the federal courts and hence their direction.
Yet there is no formal mechanism by which the people themselves can
directly establish or fix the Constitution's meaning. While the people
can be moved to take great actions in extraordinary situations, they
are usually bystanders in the Constitution's day-to-day interpretation.
The people themselves lack the time or the inclination to sit in review
of every constitutional interpretation and somehow set it right.
Below, we first consider Kramer's arguments in favor of popular
constitutionalism and against judicial supremacy. As noted, we regard
them as lacking sufficient rigor, making it unclear what he favors and
opposes. Then we advance the argument in favor of judgment
supremacy and against interpretive supremacy.
I.
At the core of Kramer's book is a seemingly simple and "popular"
proposition: the people themselves should decide the Constitution's
meaning.10 Surprisingly though, Kramer never makes clear what this
means. Does Kramer suppose that the people will routinely and finally
decide constitutional questions? Or does he instead mean that, in
extraordinary situations, the people will insist upon their preferred
reading of the Constitution? Most of the time Kramer writes as if he
favors the former, more active, popular role.11 Other times he seems to
conclude that a more passive, rare popular constitutionalism is the
best we can hope for from the busy, distracted, and typically divided
people.12 Kramer's discussion of popular constitutionalism is also
muddled because by the end of his book, he seems to treat it
synonymously with departmentalism - the idea that each coordinate
10. P. 227 ("Americans in the past always came to the same conclusion: that it was their
right, and their responsibility, as republican citizens to say finally what the Constitution
means. The question is, would Americans today do the same? Are we still prepared to insist
on our prerogative to control the meaning of our Constitution?").
11. For example, Kramer states:
Neither the Founding generation nor their children nor their children's children, right on
down to our grandparents' generation, were so passive about their role as republican
citizens. They would not accept - did not accept - being told that a lawyerly elite had
charge of the Constitution, and they would have been incredulous if told (as we are often
told today) that the main reason to worry about who becomes president is that the winner
will control judicial appointments.
P.

228.
12. Kramer offers several options that do not directly involve American citizens at all.
The Constitution leaves room for countless political responses to an overly assertive Court:
Justices can be impeached, the Court's budget can be slashed, the President can ignore its
mandates. Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or shrink its size or pack it with new members
or give it burdensome new responsibilities or revise its procedures.

P.

249.
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branch of government must independently interpret the Constitution
in the course of performing its own functions.13 Departmentalism,
however, has no necessary relationship with popular constitutionalism.
A.

·

What Is Popular Constitutionalism?

How should the people themselves decide the Constitution's
meaning? Throughout most of his book, Kramer contends that the
people will establish the Constitution's meaning by voting, petitioning,
and, if need be, mobbing. Consistent with this view, Kramer celebrates
episodes in English and American history where he claims the people
insisted upon their understanding of fundamental law. In these
episodes, the people themselves supposedly decided the meaning of
fundamental law and judges had little or no role to play. Moreover,
most of his book suggests that popular constitutionalism yields a
viable, regular means of establishing a popular meaning. After all,
Kramer's popular constitutionalism is meant to be a substitute for
judicial supremacy, a mechanism that, whatever its faults, does
regularly generate constitutional meaning.
At the end of his book, however, Kramer bows to reality, writing
as if popular constitutionalism is possible in only those rare moments
where the people become sufficiently angered or outraged.14 Here
Kramer admits that we cannot expect the people themselves to
establish the Constitution's meaning on a recurring, continuous basis.
Hence, the choice at the end of the book is not between judicial
supremacy and voting, petitioning, and mobbing. Rather, Kramer
frames the choice as being between judicial supremacy and
departmentalism.15 Given Kramer 's persistent praise for popular
constitutionalism, one supposes that he somehow believes popular
constitutionalism and departmentalism are one and the same.
Yet Kramer's popular constitutionalism has no logical connection
to departmentalism. Kramer's popular constitutionalism is a theory
about the external relationship between the federal government and
the polity; the people decide the Constitution's meaning for all three
branches. Departmentalism is a theory about the internal relationship
between the three branches of the federal government in interpreting

13. P. 252 ("It does not follow that nothing is at stake in the choice between a system of
judicial supremacy and one based on departmental or coordinate construction.").
14. He explains that:
It takes a lot to persuade a majority in this country that particular rulings are wrong enough
to overcome this presumption [of correctness]. . . . The upshot is that the court's conduct
must be quite provocative and very unpopular, usually over a sustained period, before it will
produce actual legislative or executive countermeasure.

P. 252.
15. See supra note 13.
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the Constitution. Departmentalism, whatever its merits, cannot have
grand populist pretensions, for it says absolutely nothing about the
people's constitutional role. Departmentalism is more like "republican
constitutionalism" than "popular constitutionalism."
To the extent Kramer makes an argument in favor of popular
constitutionalism, he seems to claim that agency "slack" exists in the
people's delegation of the power to interpret the Constitution:
legislative, executive, and judicial officials may interpret the
Constitution at odds with the people's preferences, were the people to
undertake the task themselves. Indeed, during the ratification debates,
many conceived of the relationship between the people and their
elected representatives as one between a principal and its agents.16 But
in focusing on agency slack, Kramer wholly ignores the benefits of
delegation. The American people are not obsessed with the
Constitution and its meaning. They clearly have higher priorities that
occupy their time and energies (unbelievable as that might seem to
constitutional law professors). Only when their agents interpret the
Constitution outside the range of acceptable results will the people
even consider taking popular action.
We see much wisdom in a departmentalist system where popular
constitutionalism plays a role in extreme cases. Had Kramer described
and defended it, there would be much worthy of praise. But Kramer
never reconciles his powerful devotion to popular constitutionalism
as a ready, effective means of establishing constitutional meaning
with his eleventh-hour admission that the people cannot be counted
upon to continuously and effectively challenge governmental
interpretations. Nor does he discuss why he seems to believe that
popular constitutionalism and departmentalism are identical. By the
end of the book, though one is certain that Kramer favors popular
constitutionalism, one has little idea what he means by it.17
B.

Is the Original Version of Popular Constitutionalism a Viable
Means of Establishing the Constitution's Meaning?

Kramer's original version of popular constitutionalism has an
emphatically populist ring to it. He writes as if the "street" will decide
what the Constitution means. We the People - the Constitution's
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
17. One could imagine a genuine, robust, popular constitutionalism: a plebiscitary
system where constitutional questions are consistently and routinely put to the people.
Because innumerable constitutional questions could arise, there would have to be some
sorting mechanism to limit the issues that would be put to the people. Kramer never
discusses such a system where the people could routinely and continuously decide the
Constitution's meaning, probably because such a plebiscitary system has no basis in the
federal Constitution.
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makers - would never allow anyone else to tell us what the
Constitution means. None of the popular actions Kramer lauds,
however, enables the people to regularly establish the Constitution's
meaning. Voting, petitioning, and mobbing permit people to express
their general preferences, but they do not enable the people to clearly
express the fine distinctions often necessary in constitutional law.
Consider elections. As meaningful as elections are, we can never
expect that they regularly will settle disputed questions of
constitutional meaning.18 To begin with, popular voting is episodic.
The election of federal officials every two, four, or six years cannot
establish the meaning of complex constitutional provisions, such as the
First and Second Amendments, for the votes are too infrequent to
serve as a proxy on hundreds of contested constitutional law issues.
Moreover, virtually all people cast their votes with nonconstitutional
considerations in mind.19 There are two reasons why nonconstitutional
considerations regularly might take precedence. First, current voters
might favor their own policy preferences over the preferences
embodied in the Constitution. Second, even when constitutional
meaning plays some role in a voter's choice, nonconstitutional
considerations might still regularly trump, depending on the intensity
of her preferences on the issues. A voter may favor a candidate
because of his positions on taxes or the environment even if she
disagrees with the candidate's views about the constitutionality of
abortion or affirmative action. Finally, even the rare single-issue voter
whose only criterion is fidelity to the Constitution faces a dilemma in
expressing her preferences in a single vote. Few candidates will ever
completely mirror a voter's constitutional preferences. Almost always,
a voter will prefer Candidate A on some issues of constitutional
interpretation, but prefer Candidate B on others. Election of a
candidate may tell us about voters' preferences for the amalgamation
of constitutional views held by that candidate, but they do not tell us
much about voter preferences on the discrete constitutional issues
in that bundle. For all these reasons, episodic voting for candidates is

18. Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments suffers from similar problems.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 9. For a critique of the use of popular elections to establish
constitutional meanings in the absence of changes to the text, see John C. Yoo, Laws as
Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV.
757, 779-88 (2001).
19. Exit polls taken during the 2004 presidential election revealed that moral values, the
economy and jobs, terrorism, and the war in Iraq were most salient to voters. Also
registering were: health care, taxes, and education. Proper interpretation of the Constitution,
or even the more generous category of Supreme Court nominations, did not register highly.
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Moral Values Cited as a Defining Issue of the Election, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2004, at 4.

May 2005]

Against Interpretive Supremacy

1547

an inexact means of determining the people's views about
constitutional meaning.20
In theory, petitioning and mobbing do not present the same
difficulties as voting. Were they so inclined, the people themselves
could petition and/or mob to oppose or defend every official
constitutional interpretation. Yet, several circumstances conspire to
make such popular "interpretation" unlikely and ambiguous meaning that it typically will be impossible to discern a "popular"
meaning for any given constitutional provision. First, we suspect that
fewer individuals petition and mob as compared to those who vote.
While many people believe voting is a civic duty, far fewer probably
share this sense about petitioning and mobbing. Second, most
questions of constitutional meaning do not arouse any level of popular
emotion sufficient to trigger mobbing or petitioning. There are many
more mundane constitutional matters than the hot button issues of
abortion, privacy, and affirmative action. All this suggests that, for the
vast majority of constitutional questions, the people will not take to
the streets.
Even where some issue moves a large number of people on an
issue that involves the Constitution, the meaning of popular action will
be indeterminate. Suppose one million people conduct a mass protest
and letter writing campaign against the death penalty. Does it follow
that they have established a popular meaning of the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition? How do we
construe the silence of the millions who might agree with the
judiciary's conclusions about the constitutionality of the death penalty,
and so choose to do nothing? Or suppose pro-life groups succeed in
gathering protest marches that dwarf the size of pro-choice rallies.
Does this mean that the pro-life group "wins" the interpretational
question? Even if we agreed that the overwhelming majority of the
people agreed with a reading of the Constitution, the precise meaning
would be indeterminate without a text. For instance, we know pro
choice rallies support Roe v. Wade,21 but are rally goers uniformly
against parental notification and in favor of permitting late-term
abortions? We can guess, but these and other meanings are hardly
obvious. Given the obvious difficulties with discerning a popular
20. In contrast, because they "vote" much more often, members of the three branches of
government face few impediments to acting upon their understanding of the Constitution.
Judges may issue judgments precisely on a statute's constitutionality; when presented with
legislation, executives may (indeed must) judge the constitutionality and the wisdom of it;
and legislators, since they vote on each bill, are afforded a ready opportunity to gauge that
bill's constitutionality. While each of these officials may choose to ignore questions about
the constitutionality of government action, they at least have a much easier time of
interpreting the Constitution. The people are not so fortunate.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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constitutional interpretation and given that Kramer never presents a
theory explaining why a mob or petition should be considered proxy
for the people as a whole, we do not know why Kramer places such
stock in voting, petitioning, and mobbing.
If all this is true, what of Kramer's claim that many founding-era
politicians cited the people as the Constitution's ultimate guardians?
Were people more virtuous, civic-minded, and politically active in the
good old days? We agree that many founders who cited the
availability of judicial review as a means of checking Congress also
emphasized the role the people might play if Congress violated the
Constitution. While some of this was perhaps sincere, much of it was
an attempt to respond to claims that the Constitution granted too
much power to the federal government. After citing the Constitution's
structural protections, such as bicameralism, the presidential veto, and
judicial review, the Constitution's supporters cited the people as the
Constitution's ultimate defenders.
Yet few Federalists seriously could have expected that the people
would consistently serve as dependable, regular, and faithful guardians
of the Constitution. After all, the people themselves had pressed state
legislators to violate the state constitutions, so much so that the
judiciaries came to be seen as necessary bulwarks of limited
government and of minority rights.22 Moreover, as James Iredell wrote
at the time, the people would suffer quite a few constitutional
violations before they could be expected to rise up.23 People have
neither the time nor the inclination to examine the wisdom and
constitutionality of every governmental action. It is not that
government officials are superior diviners of the Constitution's
meaning; it is that the people, after they toil, pray, and spend time with
their families, have precious little time to serve as the ever-watchful
guardians of the Constitution.
C.

The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism

Though Kramer never systematically considers the potential
drawbacks of popular constitutionalism, he does admit that it suffers a
few weaknesses. In his Epilogue, he writes that it "takes a lot to
persuade a majority in this country that particular rulings are wrong
enough to overcome" the modern-day presumption that the judiciary
has properly construed the Constitution (p. 252). Kramer also admits

22 See ]ACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 49-50 (1996).
23. As Iredell explained, "We well know how difficult it is to excite the resistance of a
whole people. . . . A thousand injuries may be suffered, and many hundreds ruined,
before this can be brought about." AN ELECTOR, To THE PUBLIC, IN 2 LIFE
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145, 147 (Griffith J. McRee ed., Peter Smith
1949) (1857).
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that "[t]he upshot is that the Court's conduct must be quite
provocative and very unpopular, usually over a sustained period,
before it will produce actual legislative or executive countermeasures"
(p. 252). These concessions rob popular constitutionalism of much of
its attractiveness.
But popular constitutionalism has many other difficulties. First,
there may be reason to doubt whether the people are sufficiently
familiar with the Constitution to discern its meaning (even assuming
that we have agreed upon some way of establishing its meaning).
Second, it seems likely that many people pay less attention to
interpreting the Constitution and more to their policy preferences.
Third, Kramer is never clear what the Constitution actually represents.
Is it merely the preferences of the current majority for certain rules of
self-government, in which case it should be easy for the people to
change them? Or does the Constitution establish enduring rules set
out by previous generations that are intended to be difficult to
change? Although Kramer often refers to the people's ability to settle
the Constitution's meaning, at times his ardor for popular
constitutionalism seems to stem frcm the notion that popular
interpretation of the Constitution allows the people to alter it.24
The questions that necessarily arise from Kramer's academic
project are intricate and difficult. We do not pretend to know the
answer to all these questions. But some discussion of each of
them (and many others) would have been appropriate in a
book extolling the people themselves as final constitutional
interpreters. Unfortunately, Kramer's book is short on the specifics of
popular constitutionalism.
Once again, we are not opposed to the idea that the Constitution
contemplates an extraconstitutional check on the branches of the
federal government. But we see many problems with the idea of the
people as the constant and final interpreters of the Constitution. And
as we discuss in the next parts of this essay, whether the people
interpret the Constitution or not does not meaningfully bear
on how the federal government itself allocates the function of
constitutional interpretation.
II.
The second core feature of The People Themselves is its criticism of
judicial supremacy. Kramer, however, never identifies his precise

24. This is certainly the worry in removing the power of interpretation from the
.iudiciarv's hands. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) ("Shifting legislative
majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed
amendment process contained in Article V.").
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target. Does Kramer merely oppose interpretive supremacy - the
view that the courts are the final arbiters of the Constitution's
meaning, such that the rest of society (including the political branches)
must embrace its understandings? Or does he also oppose the more
limited notion of judgment supremacy - that even if the courts are
not supreme in their constitutional expositions, the other branches
must nonetheless enforce their j udgments? The People Themselves
seems oblivious to the many scholars who have wrestled with these
issues before; discussion of their arguments would have made these
questions clear. Here, we define judicial supremacy - something
Kramer does not do - and criticize his arguments against it.
A.

What Is Judicial Supremacy?

"Judicial Supremacy" is a well-worn phrase that bears several
meanings. One is that the judiciary determines the Constitution's
meaning such that the entire nation must accept the judiciary's reading
of the Constitution. This seems to be the judicial supremacy that finds
voice in Cooper v. Aaron.25 Once the Supreme Court concluded that
the Constitution prohibited segregated schools, all federal and state
officials had to take measures to end segregation in schools or
otherwise violate their oath to the Constitution. Under this extreme
version of judicial supremacy, it is not only emphatically the judiciary's
duty to say what the Constitution means, but it is also the exclusive
right of the judiciary to say what the Constitution means.26 We call this
view "interpretive supremacy."
Another form of judicial supremacy is "judgment supremacy,"
where the only thing that is supreme is the judiciary's judgments. On
this view, the executive branch and Congress need not adopt the
judiciary's conclusions about the Constitution's meaning. The political
branches are free to articulate, advocate, and act upon alternative
constitutional understandings. The only thing the political branches
cannot do is ignore or thwart the final judgments issued by courts.
Hence, members of Congress may pass legislation contrary to the
judiciary's constitutional interpretations so long as they do not impede
or overturn a particular judgment. Likewise, the President may
vigorously and publicly disagree with the Supreme Court's

25. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). As the Court explains:
It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land. and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of
binding effect on the States any[t]hing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137. 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the j udicial department to say w hat the law is.").
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interpretation of some constitutional provision so long as she
continues to execute the judiciary's judgments.
An important but rarely discussed exception to judgment
supremacy helps prove the rule. The pardon power grants the
President the power to nullify judgments against those convicted of
committing offenses against the United States.27 One could argue that
the Constitution recognizes only this one exception to the federal
courts' final say over cases, implying that neither the President nor
Congress enjoy the ability to ignore judgments in any other area.
While Kramer obviously opposes interpretive supremacy for the
judiciary, he never clearly states his position on judgment supremacy.
He says little about what the political branches must do when faced
with a judgment based on reasoning they reject. This is odd because he
is clearly aware of the distinction. Indeed, he cites James Madison
as opposing judgment supremacy because Madison apparently
believed that judgment supremacy (being the last in time to decide
a constitutional question) practically guaranteed interpretive
supremacy (p. 252).
At times, Kramer hints that his rejection of judicial supremacy
encompasses both interpretive and judgment supremacy. For instance,
Kramer states that under the departmentalist theory, the judiciary's
decisions only have force if the other branches adopt them.28 Even
though there is an ambiguity in this claim (because one does not know
if Kramer is referring to the opinion, the judgment, or both), this
discussion seems to suggest that Kramer opposes both interpretive and
judgment supremacy. Another time, however, Kramer uses "judicial
supremacy" in a way that suggests that he does not mean for it to refer
to judgment supremacy. Discussing Lincoln, Kramer claims that
Lincoln opposed judicial supremacy.29 Yet as we have noted, Lincoln
generally believed he had to enforce judgments. Kramer's treatment
of Lincoln suggests that whenever Kramer refers to judicial
supremacy, he only means interpretive supremacy and not judgment
supremacy. After reading his book, we could not discern Kramer's
position on judgment supremacy.

27. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 1.
28. P. 252 (contrasting judicial supremacy with departmentalism and suggesting that
only under the latter theory does the authority of judicial decisions depend upon the
reactions of other branches); see also p. 235.
29. P. 212 (describing Lincoln's efforts to recognize black citizenship in a number
of contexts).
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Kramer's Surprisingly Weak Case Against Judicial Supremacy

Regardless of the version of judicial supremacy under
consideration, it is certainly the regnant ideology in the modern
academy. Kramer clearly recognizes that popular constitutionalism,
whatever its historical support, enjoys little to no popular or scholarly
backing.3° Knowing this, Kramer ought to systematically have
explained the benefits and drawbacks of each, with an eye to
explaining why popular constitutionalism is functionally superior to
judicial supremacy.
Yet Kramer never does this. He takes a few stabs against judicial
supremacy, arguing against the notion that it is necessary to avoid
conflicts about the meaning of the law and against the notion that
courts offer a superior means of protecting the Constitution's
fundamental commitments. He makes no similar effort to explore the
comparative costs and benefits of popular constitutionalism.
Rather than mounting a comprehensive attack on judicial
supremacy, Kramer's book compiles vast amounts of history to show
that, from time to time, members of the political branches and/or the
public have opposed judicial supremacy. While his historical claims
are interesting, he never explains why we should care about this
history. Is it because the original understanding of the Constitution
binds us today?31 Is it because history is the product of a tradition that
should be followed as precedent in a system of common law
constitutionalism? Is history simply the record of previous decisions
that should be followed only when appropriate? Rather than make
any of these claims, Kramer's argument appears to be that since many
people have opposed judicial supremacy in the past and since many of
them claimed that the people were the Constitution's ultimate
guardians, this is how we ought to read the Constitution today.
Of course, such arguments will not convince supporters of judicial
supremacy to embrace popular constitutionalism. Those who favor
judicial supremacy usually see wisdom in having one institution decide
the Constitution's final meaning.32 Having an ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution's meaning serves the values of finality and stability in the
law. While supporters of judicial supremacy might conceivably favor
legislative supremacy or executive supremacy, they will not abandon

30. P. 8 ("Many, perhaps most, scholars today believe that 'popular sovereignty' is and
can be expressed only at rare moments, that 'the people' are otherwise either absent or
present only as an abstraction.").
31. In his earlier work Kramer expressly denies that we ought to embrace popular
constitutionalism (and thereby reject judicial supremacy) merely because the Founders
made this choice. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 3, at 14.
32 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 1 10 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) (defending judicial supremacy).
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judicial supremacy for a system long on populist rhetoric and short on
specifics.
Others support judicial supremacy because they clearly prefer the
judiciary's constitutional readings in certain substantive areas over the
readings that would prevail in the absence of judicial supremacy. Had
their preferences prevailed through the regular majoritarian process,
they likely would not have supported judicial supremacy in the first
place. Hence the last thing these folks would want is a system of
constitutional interpretation by majority vote.
Despite having read Kramer's books and articles, we have only a
vague sense of what popular constitutionalism is and why Kramer
favors it. We also have an inadequate sense of what Kramer means by
judicial supremacy and why Kramer opposes it. We think these
difficulties stem from Kramer's preoccupation with history. As
originalists, we love history; but even we see the wisdom of a little
more precision and analysis of that history, including an explanation
for why history matters. In the end, The People Themselves reads
more like a two-century long story than an argument for a greater
popular role in constitutional interpretation.
III.
While we are critical of Kramer 's claims, we could hardly blame
him for attempting to resolve the central question that has fascinated
many constitutional law scholars. A number of leading scholars
recently have questioned the legitimacy, usefulness, or existence of
judicial review, including Michael Klarman,33 Richard Posner,34 Mark
Tushnet,35 Adrian Vermeule,36 and Jeremy Waldron.37 A broader
group of authors, including Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer,38
Neal Devins and Louis Fisher,39 Sanford Levinson,40 Michael
McConnell,41 Robert Nagel,42 and Michael Stokes Paulsen,43 among
33. Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
145 (1998).
34. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 15-27 (2001 ).
35. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
36. Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 WM.
REV. 1557 (2001).

&

MARY L.

37. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
38. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 32.
39. Neal Devins
REV. 83 (1998).

&

Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L.

40. Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987).
41. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997).
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others, has been debating whether the federal judiciary enjoys
interpretive supremacy. Along with Kramer's book, much of this
discussion seems to have been precipitated by the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions and by its declaration in City of Boerne v. Flores44
that its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment binds Congress.
We have yet to see whether academics display the same level of
concern about judicial supremacy in the wake of the Supreme Court's
unprecedented declaration of authority to review the legal status of
enemy prisoners captured in wartime.4s Nonetheless, these articles
draw on a deeper trend of skepticism toward judicial review inspired
by Cooper v. Aaron46 and the decisions of the Warren Court in the
1960s, or by the decisions of the Four Horsemen in the New Deal
period. In this respect, these authors are tackling the same problems
that were central to the work of Jesse Choper,47 John Hart Ely,48
Learned Hand,49 and Herbert Wechsler.so
It would be unfair to criticize Kramer without at least sketching
out our own views on the subject. After all, to quote our teacher Akhil
Amar, it takes a theory to beat a theory.s1 In our prior work, we
argued that the Constitution contemplates and authorizes judicial
review.s2 The Constitution assumes that each branch will interpret the
Constitution and act in a manner consistent with it. The judiciary is
not excepted from that fundamental obligation. When a judge hears a
case involving a conflict between some statute and the Constitution,
the judge must favor the Constitution.
Here we argue in favor of judgment supremacy, but against
interpretive supremacy. We propose that the only obligation the other
branches have to judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution is to
enforce the judgment in that individual case. They have no obligation
42. Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 849 (1998).
43. Paulsen, supra note 6.
44. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
45. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) .
46. 358 U . S . 1 (1958).
47. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980).
48. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
49. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
50. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
51. See also Richard A. Epstein. Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Reioinder to
Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983) ("Nonetheless it takes a
theory to beat a theory . . . . ).
"

52. See, e.g., Prakash
note 3.

&

Yoo, Origins, supra note 4; Prakash

&

Yoo, Questions, supra
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to adopt and implement the constitutional interpretations that form
the basis of those judgments. This was the position President Abraham
Lincoln took toward Dred Scott. 53 We also discuss how the political
branches should respond to judicial efforts to secure interpretive
supremacy for judicial decisions.
Before beginning, we should make our aims and methodology
clear. Our aims are positive and not normative. Here, we only address
what the Constitution originally meant. Nonetheless, though our
argument is a positive one, we believe that our rendition of the
Constitution's implicit interpretational rules is normatively attractive.
Our methodology in discerning the Constitution's meaning is
originalist: we merely try to establish what the Constitution meant
when it was ratified. We do not think that political developments
subsequent to the Constitution's ratification should control this
reading, although they do provide data on how certain systems have
worked out in practice.
We start off with what we hope is common ground: that the
Constitution permits, indeed requires, each branch of government to
interpret the Constitution. Some, such as Kramer, have argued that
the Constitution does not expressly authorize judicial review and that
the other branches somehow have a greater claim to interpret the
Constitution. This gets things exactly backward. From the beginning,
the judiciary's power to interpret the Constitution has been on firm
ground and it was sometimes (but incorrectly) claimed that the other
branches have no place in interpreting the Constitution. The judicial
power to hear cases arising under the Constitution was understood to
be the authority to decide the meaning of the Constitution in such
cases. This is one aspect of the Constitution's supremacy as higher law
superior to a statute. If a case presents a conflict between a
constitutional provision and a statute, a federal court exercises judicial
review in choosing the proper rule of decision.
Several constitutional provisions confirm this intuition. Article VI
requires that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."54 Again, in order
to decide whether a state law conflicts with a federal constitutional
provision, federal courts would have to interpret the federal
constitution first. The Supremacy Clause also makes clear that the
Constitution itself is law to be enforced in court, rather than a vague

53. See supra note 8.
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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set of political-legal principles outside of judicial cognizance. Both
Article III and Article VI include the Constitution as a source of law
the courts will enforce in performing their unique constitutional duty
to decide cases or controversies.
While the other branches lack such specific interpretational
authority, they too must interpret the Constitution. After all, members
of each branch take an oath to the Constitution, which means, at a
minimum, that they must discern the meaning of the Constitution they
are pledged to uphold.55 What makes them different is the form that
their review takes. The President, for example, has the duty to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution."56 To defend the
Constitution, the President presumably must have some idea of what it
means. Moreover, to exercise his own constitutional powers properly,
the President must interpret them first. To take but one example, the
President must give meaning to different constitutional provisions
when deciding whether to veto a law that might be unconstitutional.
This is not judicial review because it does not arise in the course of
deciding a case or controversy. Nevertheless, this presidential review
occurs through the President's performance of his unique
constitutional responsibilities.
A similar analysis applies to Congress. Per the oaths clause,
congressmen must support the Constitution. Consistent with their duty
to support the Constitution, congressmen cannot enact laws that are
unconstitutional. Individual members of Congress, therefore, have the
independent duty to review the constitutionality of proposed
legislation before them and to oppose unconstitutional laws. The same
principle is true for state executive, legislative, and judicial officials:
each must interpret the Constitution in the course of performing their
own constitutional responsibilities.
Given all this, judicial review is not unique. It is merely the means
by which the federal judges obey the Constitution while executing
their constitutional function of deciding cases or controversies. Other
branches of the government have the same obligation, but different
functions that give it expression. As President Andrew Jackson
observed when vetoing legislation rechartering the Bank of the United
States:
·

55. We understand that a constitution might enshrine one institution as the final arbiter
of a constitution's meaning, in which case all others must adhere to that institution's readings
of the constitution. But even if a constitution contained such a provision, one would still
have to interpret the constitution to see if it contained the interpretive supremacy provision
described above. Some level of independent interpretation is simply unavoidable. We, of
course, do not believe that the federal Constitution contains any provision relating to
interpretive supremacy.
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate,
and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or
resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it
is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial
decision.57

Judicial review is just a subset of a more general category of
constitutional review.
Where are the people in this structure? Obviously, the people are
free to interpret the Constitution as they see fit. They need not look to
the legislative, executive, or judiciary for guidance in discerning the
Constitution's meaning any more than these branches must look to
each other. As noted earlier, however, the people are not uniquely
invested with the power to establish the Constitution's meaning. The
Constitution does not contemplate that the people will regularly,
routinely establish its meaning on a government-wide scale to the
exclusion of other governmental actors.
To the extent that the founders believed that the people could
institutionally exercise the power to interpret the Constitution, they
appear to have thought of it on a smaller, more manageable scale.
Historians have shown that framing-period thought allowed juries to
interpret the Constitution when deciding cases.58 No single jury,
however, can bind another to its constitutional interpretation. Nor can
it force the government to act positively to carry out its views. Nor can
its views extend beyond criminal law. Juries can only prevent the
government from enforcing a certain constitutional meaning through
an individual criminal prosecution. Other than through juries, the
Constitution permits popular interpretation of its terms only through
Article V's amendment process.
More realistically, the Constitution envisions that the people will
make their legal views known, in a very rough and imprecise way,
through the political process. This process is endogenous to the
Constitution, because it is established by the Constitution itself. The
electorate can vote for candidates who come closest to mirroring their
desired constitutional views; presidents can then nominate, and the
Senate confirm, federal judges who share those views. The people also
can elect state officials that come close to the people's desired
constitutional views, and these officials can attempt to use the states'
place in our political system to influence the actions of the federal

57. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 576, 582 (James D. Richardson
ed., Washington, Government Printing Office 1896).
58. SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO·
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
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government. This is, after all, what Jefferson and Madison attempted
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves.59 Kramer is right to point out
that voting, petitioning, and other forms of mass political activity
give the people a role in constitutional interpretation. But this role
is indirect.
Kramer, however, made two mistakes on this issue. First, he
believes that since it was possible for the people to influence the
interpretation of the Constitution, the people must enjoy interpretive
supremacy to the point of precluding judicial review. But that makes
no sense, just as the argument that because the people can interpret
the Constitution through the jury there is no need for judicial review
does not make sense. Jesse Chopet° and Herbert Wechsler61 made a
similar mistake in suggesting that judicial review of federalism
questions was unnecessary because states had a strong hand in the
composition of the federal govemment.62 The one power does not
necessarily exclude the other.
Second, Kramer has confused exogenous and endogenous means
for interpreting the Constitution. The Constitution's endogenous
mechanism for popular participation in interpretation is the electoral
process. An exogenous method originates outside the Constitution
itself - massive political action, refusal to follow the Constitution (or
a current interpretation), or opposition to the government - and
cannot be defined or limited by reference to the Constitution. In
certain extreme and unusual cases, the people can take such
exogenous measures, but by doing so, they reject the existing legal
framework. Hence, the people of the states adopted the Constitution
by a process that violated the rules for amending the Articles of
Confederation.63 One can view the Civil War as an attempt by a
minority of the American people to engage in popular mobilization to
change (or maintain) a constitutional meaning at odds with that to be
adopted by the elected branches of government. But because these

59. The Kentucky Resolves were adopted on November 10, 1798, and November 14,
1799. See 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 131-35 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987). The Virginia Resolves were adopted on Dec. 21, 1798. See id. at 135-36; see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Kentucky and the Constitution: Lessons from the 1790s for the 1990s, 85
KY. L.J. 1 (1997).
60. See CHOPER, supra note 47.
61. See Wechsler, supra note 50.
62. Professor Kramer has made this mistake in previous pieces. See Prakash & Yoo,
Questions, supra note 4, at 355 ("Professor Kramer, like Professors Jesse Choper and
Herbert Wechsler before him, ignores the constitutional text and structure. Fairly read, the
Constitution's text and structure establishes judicial review in a number of ways.") (internal
footnotes omitted).
63. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (U.S. 1781) ("[N]or shall any alteration at
any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress
of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every. state.").
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measures are exogenous to the Constitution, they do not, as a formal
matter, alter the Constitution's separation of powers or its system of
decentralized constitutional interpretation.
History suggests that these exogenous efforts to alter the
Constitution's meaning may not be as durable as the old-fashioned
path of amending the Constitution. Kramer does not differ much from
Bruce Ackerman in the view that mass political movements exogenous
to the Constitution should affect its interpretation.64 Both treat the
New Deal, with its overwhelming majorities in support of the
expansion of federal power, the creation of the administrative state,
and the taming of the Supreme Court, as a legitimate change to the
interpretation of the Constitution. There is an important difference,
however, between the New Deal and earlier periods. During
Reconstruction, for example, the radical Republicans enshrined their
constitutional understanding in three constitutional amendments that
significantly altered the relationship between the federal government,
the states, and citizens. In contrast, the New Deal period experienced
no constitutional amendments. This may explain why certain elements
of the New Deal state have undergone criticism and efforts
at change.65
Our departmentalist approach to constitutional review by the three
branches clearly rejects the notion of interpretive supremacy. Courts
are not supreme in interpreting the Constitution. No branch is. The
constitutional text and structure merely permit the federal courts a
power of judicial review in the same way that they should be
understood to grant the other branches the power of interpreting the
Constitution while performing their own duties. Indeed, the authority
of the federal courts, by design, is far weaker than that of the other
branches. While the judiciary enjoys sufficient independence - due to
life tenure and irreducible salary - to check the other branches
without fear of direct reprisal, it has no institutional mechanisms to
actually enforce its constitutional views. Enforcement of the Supreme
Court's decisions, as many have noted since the time of Alexander
Hamilton,66 ultimately depends on the agreement of the other
branches and the support of the public.
64.

See ACKERMAN, supra note 9.

65. See, e.g. , United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("I am aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from
the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our substantial effects test. My review of the
case law indicates that the substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century.").
66. The judiciary has, as Hamilton explained, "no influence over either the sword or the
purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely
judgment . . . . " Even to enforce its judgments, he observed, the judiciary "must ultimately

1560

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:1539

At times, the scholarly obsession with judicial review and the
counter-majoritarian difficulty exaggerates the power of the courts. As
an institution, the federal courts have relatively few personnel and
only about $3 billion in annual funds. Sitting at the top of a slow,
decentralized decisionmaking process, the Supreme Court hears
roughly eighty cases a year. These limited resources restrict the ability
of the federal courts to hear cases of all kinds, not just constitutional
cases. Federal courts depend on private parties to bring constitutional
issues to them, and they raise numerous procedural barriers - such as
standing, ripeness, mootness, the political question doctrine, and the
avoidance doctrine - to the decision of those issues. Because of their
greater responsibilities and scope for action, the other branches will
encounter constitutional issues more often and have greater resources
to reach decisions and enforce them. Not only does Congress enact
many more laws than the Supreme Court can review, but because
Congress often delegates rulemaking authority to the agencies,
administrative regulations produce a large number of laws every year
that the courts cannot possibly review.
As departmentalists in the Jeffersonian and Lincoln tradition, we
accept that each branch may make final decisions within their spheres
of responsibilities based on their own readings of the Constitution.
Few doubt that the President may veto a bill that he believes to be
unconstitutional, refuse to prosecute under a criminal law he believes
to be unconstitutional, or pardon those previously convicted under a
law he concludes is unconstitutional. But what happens when the
branches adopt conflicting interpretations of the Constitution? In the
academic literature, the focal point for this question has been whether
the President must enforce Supreme Court decisions with which he
disagrees. Presidents themselves have held varying views on this
question. President Eisenhower, for example, enforced Brown v.
Board of Education67 even though he reportedly was skeptical about
the decision on the merits.68 President Andrew Jackson famously
refused to enforce a Marshall Court order stopping the removal of
Indian tribes from Georgia by exclaiming: "John Marshall has made
his decision, now let him enforce it."69 Abraham Lincoln took
something of a middle view by concluding that he was not bound by

depend upon the aid of the executive arm."
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

THE

FEDERALIST

No.

78, at 523 (Alexander

67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 35-36, 15759 (2000).
69. DAVID C. TOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 365 (1948); G. EDW.ARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1813-35 (1988).

1561

Against Interpretive Supremacy

May 2005]

the Court's reasoning in Dred Scott,70 which had struck down a
congressional effort to limit slavery in the territories, but had an
obligation to enforce the judgment upon the parties in the case itself.
As Lincoln said in his debates with Stephen Douglas:
We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave

by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. . . . [B ] ut we
nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be
binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall
be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no
measure

that

that decision. 71

does

not

actually

concur

with

the

principles

of

In terms of academic views, it is probably fair to say that the
majority of scholars support judicial supremacy: the Court enjoys
interpretive supremacy such that its decisions bind the other branches
not just in the case before it but all other similar cases.72 Professor
Laurence Tribe speaks for most when he writes that "the Executive
Branch must enforce the law according to the Executive's view of
what the Constitution requires . . . so long as the Executive does not
thereby usurp the role of the Article III Judiciary as the ultimate
expositor of the Constitution in actual cases and controversies."73 On
the other end of the spectrum, Professor Michael Paulsen has adopted
the Jacksonian position, rejecting both judgment supremacy and
interpretive supremacy.74
The Lincoln position has failed to attract many defenders, in part
perhaps because it has proven difficult to explain why a President
should be able to simultaneously disagree with the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution, yet nonetheless remain under
obligation to enforce the judgment. No doubt Lincoln himself was
forced to reach this compromise by the need to appeal to Republican
antipathy toward slavery without taking the radical political position
of disregarding the Supreme Court entirely.75 Nonetheless, we think
that Lincoln had matters just about right. Each branch, as a practical
matter, must interpret the Constitution when performing its unique
functions, and the Constitution does not set up one branch's decision
on these issues above any other. Therefore, Lincoln was right to say
70. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 ( 1856).
71. Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 8, at 245, 255.
72. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 726 (3d ed.
2000); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
73. TRIBE, supra note 72, at 726.
74. Paulsen, supra note 6, at 226.
75. DAYID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 199-202 (1995).
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that the reasoning of Dred Scott did not bind his views or policies, as
President, on the restriction of slavery in the territories. We also think,
however, that Lincoln was right to conclude that executives had a
responsibility to enforce the judgment in Dred Scott itself and return
Dred Scott to his owner (even though we stress that we
obviously disagree strongly with Chief Justice Taney's reading of
the Constitution).
Why? We believe this conclusion arises from the principle that the
Constitution makes each branch supreme in performing its respective
functions. The courts are supreme in resolving cases. We can criticize
their judgments, but they are final and to be enforced because the
Constitution commits the resolution of certain disputes to the courts.
This point may become clearer when we examine the difference
between a judgment and an opinion. The judgment is the necessary
and legally operative action of the federal courts, and as such it is the
only part of a decision which has constitutional force. It is the result of
the judiciary's power to decide cases or controversies. The opinion is
the court's explanation of why it reached that particular judgment. It is
only an explanation for a judgment. Suppose federal courts only issued
judgments and not opinions. The other branches would still have a
constitutional duty to implement those judgments as the final exercise
of a coordinate branch's constitutional authority. Scholarly focus on
the opinion has clouded our understanding that only the judgment
represents the court's final action.
As we noted, other branches also have this kind of operational
supremacy. An obvious example is the President's pardon power. A
president may pardon someone on a wholly idiosyncratic and
misguided understanding of the Constitution. Along with the official
document of the pardon, the President might issue his opinion as to
why the pardon was necessary to right an unconstitutional wrong. That
opinion might directly conflict with the judiciary's interpretation of the
same constitutional provision. Nonetheless the pardon is final and the
judiciary cannot ignore it on the grounds that the President's
constitutional reasoning is erroneous. For instance, suppose that the
President interprets the Constitution as forbidding the prosecution of
some individual and grants her a pardon. Suppose also that a future
prosecutor under the control of a subsequent President believes a
prosecution of that individual for the same offense is warranted.
Neither the future prosecutor nor the judiciary can strike down or
ignore the pardon on the grounds that the previous President misread
the Constitution. One might question why the judiciary (or the future
President) should be forced to adhere to the constitutional reasonings
of the earlier President. But that is the wrong question. When the
judiciary permits the defendant to raise the pardon as a defense, the
judiciary does not thereby acquiesce to the prior President's
constitutional interpretations. Instead the judiciary accords to the
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pardon the power that the Constitution assigns to it - the power to
prevent prosecution and punishment.
The same is true for judgments. When the judiciary issues a
judgment, others must regard it as the final disposition of a dispute.
When the executive branch enforces a judgment, it performs a time
honored executive function. In fact, to allow the executive branch to
decline to enforce judgments at its own discretion might functionally
transfer the authority to decide Article III cases or controversies to
the President. A duty to enforce judgments does not mean that
executive branch officers acquiesce in the constitutional readings
underlying the judgment. One can enforce judgments even if one
completely disagrees with the readings that lead to them.
Is judgment supremacy but a hop, skip, and a jump away from
interpretive supremacy? Won't presidents and Congress grow tired of
taking executive and legislative action based on their independent
constitutional interpretations when they predictably will lose
before a court? Why bother with interpretive independence
when acknowledging interpretive supremacy will help you win more
cases in court?
We do not believe that judgment finality inevitably leads to
interpretive supremacy, any more than pardon finality leads to
presidential supremacy. Because Congress and the President resolve
many more questions of constitutional law, any acquiescence to
interpretive supremacy for the courts must stem not from the
consequences of judgment supremacy, but from something else. That
something else might be a desire to devote time and resources to
solving more pressing social problems for which electoral rewards may
be higher. Or it might be a desire to avoid responsibility for having to
resolve difficult constitutional questions for which many people hold
intense, but conflicting, preferences.
All this raises the question of what to do with judgments so far
beyond the pale that most if not all would blanch at their enforcement.
One is tempted to say that the Constitution somehow permits the
President to ignore "crazy judgments" or judgments based on "crazy
constitutional interpretations." But we will not give into this
temptation. We believe the Constitution calls upon the President to
enforce every judgment. We suspect that the founders never
contemplated what to do when the judiciary issues completely
unfounded judgments. They did grant the President plenary powers to
counteract some extreme examples of oppression by the judiciary. So,
for example, if the judiciary were to issue a judgment simply
imprisoning someone without trial, the President has the power to
pardon that person. But beyond pardons, the Framers did not
explicitly grant the President the right to "review" judgments, and
established instead the familiar rule of executive enforcement of
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judgment. Presidential refusal to implement judgments is an
extraconstitutional measure that ought to be reserved for only the
most grave circumstances.
CONCLUSION
What has been lacking in the recent surge of works calling for an
end to j udicial review is a sense of proportion. These works seem to
argue that in order to end unwarranted judicial supremacy we must
end judicial review. Apparently, Kramer believes the American
people should return to mobbing; the only significant mobbing that
appears to happen these days is in response to sporting events. A
Tushnet,76 or a Post and Siegel,77 seem equally unrealistic in suggesting
ways to take the Constitution away from the courts and to return it to
Congress. At times, critics seem to hope that the courts themselves
will repudiate j udicial supremacy, something that appears extremely
unlikely given the course of decisions over the past decade.
We have a different proposal, one that builds upon our vision of
the way in which the people can interpret the Constitution through
methods endogenous to the Constitution. We agree with the Court's
critics that our President, Congress, and courts should move away
from the prevailing system of judicial supremacy in interpreting the
Constitution. We think they are wrong, however, in calling for an end
to judicial review in order to achieve that end. This is akin to arguing
that we can preclude presidential interpretive supremacy by
eliminating the veto power. Rather, we think the people should use
the usual political processes created by the Constitution to restore
departmentalism in constitutional interpretation. This could be done
fairly easily through the judicial appointments process. The President
simply could choose to nominate only those who agree that judicial
interpretation of the Constitution is not binding on the other branches,
and that each branch has the authority to interpret the Constitution
when executing its own constitutional functions. The Senate could
adopt this litmus test as well. Rather than merely worrying about
whether a nominee is a strict constructionist or a follower of the living
Constitution approach, both political parties could agree to nominate
and appoint departmentalists.
This would create a very different, but we think welcome, change
in the current appointments process.78 Currently, presidents and

76. TuSHNET, supra note 35, at 175.
77. See, e.g. , Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 1 1 2 YALE L.J.
1943, 1946 (2003).
78. The commentary on the Supreme Court appointments process is vast. For leading
works, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 164
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senators seem to be engaged in a delicate dance to outmaneuver each
other. Presidents choose among candidates who share their judicial
philosophy, which can range from satisfying a simple litmus test (such
as supporting the right to abortion) to a general approach to
interpretation (such as adhering to the Constitution's original
understanding). They then seek to nominate an individual whose
paper record will not suggest that he or she shares extreme versions of
the President's legal approach. Supreme Court nominees look forward
to a grilling on their views on specific issues of importance to various
interest groups. Senators devote their questions toward trying to ferret
out a nominee's views, and might reject one whose views lie outside
those of the median senator. Nomination hearings become a struggle
between nominees who do not wish to pre-judge issues by committing
to certain outcomes before they even reach the bench, and senators
who want to pin them down on specific cases and doctrines.
Our theory of departmentalism recommends a different approach.
Rather than merely investigating a nominee's theories on
constitutional interpretation or worrying whether a nominee would
reach a specific outcome on a certain question, presidents and senators
might agree to appoint nominees who did not believe in judicial
supremacy. This might have several salutary effects. First, the judges
themselves might become more respectful of the other branches'
responsibility to interpret the Constitution. Second, Presidents and
congresses might take their obligation to interpret the Constitution
more seriously, and they might become more confident that they can
act on their understandings. Third, it would have the healthy effect of
repairing our broken judicial appointments process. Under a system of
judicial supremacy, the judicial appointments process inevitably came
to resemble political campaigns. If the Court has the final say on
questions ranging from abortion to affirmative action to gay rights, the
only way for groups interested in changing national policy on these
questions is to alter the personnel on the Court. Under a system of
judicial supremacy, control of Court appointments becomes one of the
great political prizes in the contest over social policy.
Finally, coordinate constitutional review would return at least
some control over national policy on these highly contested issues to
the political process. Efforts to change national policy would not only
(1988); John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REv. 633 (1993); Henry Paul
Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 202 (1988);
David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992); Symposium, Confirmation Controversy: The Selection of
a Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 832 (1990); John C. Yoo, Choosing Justices: A
Political Appointments Process and the Wages of Judicial Supremacy, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1436 (2000).
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seek change through the courts, but through the political branches.
With coordinate-branch constitutional review, there would be three
separate power centers for interpreting the Constitution, not just one.
Political actors could then change constitutional interpretation in
multiple ways, rather than only through the personnel of the Supreme
Court. A party dissatisfied with the Court's decisions on abortion or
affirmative action could seek their desired policy through executive
orders or legislation, rather than through judicial decisions. While the
judiciary would continue to issue judgments based on their reading of
the Constitution, judges would abandon all pretenses that they are
superior interpreters of the Constitution and that they are the
Constitution's final arbiters.
We do not wish to overclaim. Requiring interpretive humility from
prospective nominees to the courts is hardly a panacea. The ultimate
way of ending the judiciary's interpretive supremacy is to have the
other branches and the people regain confidence in their own ability
to interpret the Constitution. By accepting the seductive view that the
courts may establish the Constitution's meaning for everyone else, the
political branches have shirked their responsibilities. If the political
branches (and the public) can shed the habit of deciding what the
Constitution means almost solely by reference to what the courts have
said, we will have gone a long way to ending interpretive supremacy.

